

states retain some responsibility for ensuring compliance with *jus in bello* rules in the face of this normative challenge, the firms themselves and their employees must also hold themselves to account.

Although Eckert's engagement with the private military and security industry is thoughtful, it suffers, like similar accounts, from the inability of published work to update with the industry. Thus, Eckert's empirical study does not reach beyond the industry's peak in Iraq and Afghanistan. I would have appreciated Eckert's insights on more recent shifts within the industry and its practices, especially with regard to regulation and accountability, and her perspective on what these mean in light of her conclusions. Nonetheless, the important contributions of Eckert's work, sparking debates about the ongoing usefulness of just war theory, are significant beyond discussions of PMCs. A broader audience should thus be encouraged to engage with the ideas raised and conclusions put forth within this book with regard to the relevance of just war theory to the changing public–private divide in warfare, evident in the use of PMCs and other actors. As Eckert notes, the future of just war theory will be characterized by shifts in the theory to account for changes in the international system and in the use of force.

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Maritime strategy and global order: markets, resources, security. Edited by **Daniel Moran and James A. Russell.** Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. 2016. 336pp. Index. £46.50. ISBN 978 1 62616 072 9. Available as e-book.

In *Maritime strategy and global order* the editors propose a multidisciplinary approach in order to give some form to the idea of strategy as related to the seas. Methods from history, political science, political economy, case-studies and country-studies are all deployed in the various chapters, with different degrees of success. The volume is a mixed bag methodologically as well as conceptually.

One of the first problems is the contributors' lack of rigour in defining strategy, and maritime strategy in particular. The context and introduction to the collection are under-researched and undervalued in their appreciation of what the maritime system is, how it works or has worked at various points in time, and how it is or is not therefore comparable to other strategic concepts—land, air, economic or diplomatic. As such, there is a sense of shallowness or superficiality about exactly what the point and purpose of the volume are, why the individual chapters have the focus that they do and how they create a coherent whole. The study favours an emphasis on the naval element of the maritime domain to an overwhelming extent, while endeavouring to engage with the ideas of markets, economics and global finance to achieve a maritime strategic security nexus. The chapters fall under such headings as 'Long war—long peace', 'Regional security' and 'Architecture', but there is little to indicate what those mean, how they link or consolidate the chapters included under them, or make a connection between the three areas mentioned in the title. One could reasonably expect that if the title claims to see markets, resources and security being connected to achieve a maritime strategy, then those should form the organizational basis of the work. As such, the melding of the claimed constituent parts does not produce a convincing holistic picture of the way in which maritime strategy is the key enabler of a global economic system. It addresses the place of naval power, at times, in varying conditions, with varying degrees of success, in that system, but little more.

The individual chapters vary in terms of their levels of academic rigour and clarity of argument. Those on Britain's role in driving forward the globalization of the seas in the first

half of the twentieth century and the subsequent impact of the Cold War on that process, are among the more interesting. A useful exploration of conditions in the South China Sea today, with a focus on the three declared areas of exploration, is also worthy of note, as is the contribution on the relationship between maritime law and maritime strategy. The others are either too generalist or too underresearched to add much to readers' understanding of the combination of various maritime elements into a greater maritime strategy creation process. The seemingly random nature of the regional and architectural topics, as well as varying chronological focus within the individual chapters, adds to the confusion regarding the principles or tenets of maritime strategy. Disregard for the economic, political, social and technological attributes of specific ages or eras (for example the banking, transport or communication revolutions), leaves the reader unconvinced at times of the legitimacy of the claims made. A good example is the chapter on maritime strategy in the period from 1914 to 1945, that fleshes out various national naval perspectives but predominantly focuses on the Anglo-American experience. However, the emphasis on American dominance or influence in the era ignores decades of historical analysis and evidence that sees this as a period of British control and dominance, not just because of the country's naval power, but because of its empire's maritime resilience, predicated on credit creation, financial control, currency influence and trade bloc management, all facets of the period ignored in the author's haste to get to U-boats, convoys and naval battles.

Overall then, there are some nuggets to be lifted from the volume and it gives readers a hint of how to address the question of defining, and refining, the concept of maritime strategy and the linkages between naval power, markets, resources, financial power, technology and the creation of a national security strategy that is predominantly maritime. However, the book should be seen as the starting-point from which other scholarship can proceed to enhance or refute some of the initial explorations undertaken here.

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Collateral damage: a candid history of a peculiar form of death. By Frederik Rosen.

London: Hurst. 2016. 205pp. £16.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 407 3.

The aim of this book is to explore where collateral damage fits among the established notions of authority, state and governance, considering along the way the morality of the proportionality rule as such. From an 'original sin' starting-point, the concept of collateral damage is seen to have grown from the ambiguity created by human imperfection. The proportionality rule accommodates legal space for imperfect judgements, skills and weapons (p. 7).

Rosen describes in stark terms the distinction between terror bombing and collateral damage: victims of the latter are anonymous and unseen. Out of sometimes sweeping language, relevant trends emerge quickly and clearly, such as the increasing centrality of law in targeting. The author puts collateral damage and the associated proportionality rule in a sociological context and sets against these the practical and ambiguous realities of urban warfare. Risk emerges as the critically important feature.

Network-centric warfare's decentralized decision-making drives responsibility downwards and, as Rosen argues, by understanding the perspectives of those involved, rich veins of thought can be uncovered. So will human rights law come to the rescue by influencing collateral damage assessment? Analysing the implications of the right to life, the duty to investigate under human rights law is properly presented as a matter that states must consider increasingly pre-deployment. The author must be right that no customary